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Abstract: Cloud computing is being adopted more and more in recent years. It offers several benefits, such as high 
elasticity, availability and cost reduction, but yet presents some issues. Among the most important, the 
potential lack of security can affect the spreading of this technology. As cloud computing is pushing 
forward to the digital era, where users can have their own digital identity to access restricted resources or 
services, a reliable authentication and authorization system would attract more users to get involved in such 
process. This paper proposes an integration of the VOMS (Virtual Organization Membership Service) 
system for authorization and SPID (Sistema Pubblico per la gestione dell'Identità Digitale) system for 
authentication, within Cloud Foundry PaaS (Platform as a Service) model. Considerations, differences and 
interoperability matters will be addressed in order to provide a comprehensive scheme. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Cloud computing, or simply cloud, is a word that is 
getting more and more used in the last few years. 
Although it is a novel technology, it is changing the 
way we are used to thinking about programs and 
computing. Cloud computing, in fact, aims to "shift 
IT services away from local computers to the 
Internet or, generally speaking, in networks. The 
network will be the computer" (T-Systems 
Enterprise¸ 2010). This means, many next 
generation applications and resources will be 
available directly on the Internet using a browser, 
rather than on the local machine. Nevertheless, 
issues affecting cloud computing are still slowing 
down this revolution: among the most important, we 
can point out the lack of standards, that affects the 
interoperability among different providers, as well as 
the security mechanisms for managing digital 
identities and the authentication process. 
In this paper we study the integration of Cloud 
Foundry, a PaaS system, and OpenStack, an IaaS 
system, with authorization and authentication 
frameworks named VOMS (Virtual Organization 
Membership Service) and SPID (Sistema Pubblico 
per la gestione dell'Identità Digitale) respectively. 
The former is a tool used mainly in grid computing 
since several years. The latter is a system, being 
developed by the Italian government, for federated 
strong authentication; it is scheduled to enter service 
in April 2015, and complies with eIDAS European 
regulation, thus provides a framework interoperable 
not only in the Italian territory. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as 
follow. Section 2 defines the IaaS and PaaS systems, 
including their main features. The concepts of 
identity and the relative identity management are 
introduced in Section 3, in particular the definition 
of authentication and authorization, and the 
presentation of VOMS and SPID models. In Section 
4 we consider the implementation of a model that 
incorporates VOMS as authorization and SPID as 
authentication systems. 
2 IAAS AND PAAS TOOL FOR 
CLOUD 
A more technical definition of cloud computing is 
given by (Armbrust et al., 2010) as "both the 
applications delivered as services over the Internet, 
and the hardware and systems software in the data 
centers that provide those services". 
Indeed, cloud providers supply IT resources in 
terms of infrastructure, software, storage and 
bandwidths, somehow like water and electricity are 
daily supplied in our houses. Computing capability 
is offered on demand to those companies that need 
flexible IT resources, and then they pay only for the 
time resources have been used, potentially leading to 
cost savings. 
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2.1 Cloud Models 
Since cloud is a complex technology, it has been 
layered by NIST (NIST, 2011) in three main models. 
SaaS (Software as a Service): supplies the user 
with the provider's application, and users do not 
manage or control the underlying cloud 
infrastructure including network, operating system, 
and application capabilities. An example of SaaS 
application is the e-mail service such as Google 
mail, where the customer simply uses the 
application, but doesn't know the software structure 
and is not responsible for its maintenance. 
PaaS (Platform as a Service): the provider 
supports users with a framework for application 
development, so that they can build and deploy their 
own software. Users do not manage or control the 
underlying cloud infrastructure including network, 
operating system, and application capabilities, but 
have control over the deployed applications and 
possibly environment configurations.  
IaaS (Infrastructure as a Service): user is 
provided with fundamental computing resources that 
he can use to deploy and run arbitrary software. 
Users don't manage or control the underlying cloud 
infrastructure but have control over operating 
system, storage, deployed applications, and possibly 
limited control over some networking components.  
Several other "as a Service" are emerging 
recently, most notable are Database as a Service 
(DBaaS) and Backup as a Service (BaaS). The trend 
is to shift any functionality to a service provided 
through the Internet, that will bring to the dawn of 
the XaaS, "Anything as a Service" (Dixon, 2014). 
Some examples of PaaS software are OpenShift 
(OpenShift, 2014), Salesforce (Salesforce, 2014), 
AppScale (AppScale, 2014), CloudControl 
(CloudControl, 2014), Cloud Foundry (Cloud 
Foundry, 2014), Microsoft Azure Web Sites (Azure, 
2014). Regarding the IaaS, instances of well known 
systems are Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud 
(Amazon EC2, 2014), OpenStack (OpenStack, 
2014), Apache Hadoop (Apache Hadoop, 2014), 
OpenNebula (OpenNebula, 2014). 
Among all these options, we chose to use Cloud 
Foundry as PaaS and OpenStack as IaaS, because 
they are currently the leading projects in their 
category. Both are open source, developed by 
several different contributors, and supported by a 
broad community; more information are provided in 
Section 2.3. 
2.2 Benefits and Downsides 
Such technology can bring several benefits to users. 
At first, a cost saving factor for a company. A user 
can rent IT resources from a cloud instead of buying 
a physical machine, allowing to start using few 
resources at first and increase only when there is a 
further need. In this way the company avoids the 
initial hardware costs. 
Then, the pay-as-you-go offer lets consumers 
pay only for the used computing resources on a 
short-term basis (for example, processors or storage 
resources by hours), and release them when are not 
needed anymore. The result is an optimization of 
resource usage, instead of having an own server idle 
during low workload periods, thus preventing the 
overprovisioning issue. Another aspect is the 
flexibility provided by the virtually infinite 
computing capacity that cloud makes available; this 
relieves the customer from the task to foresee near 
future resource needs and relative resource provision 
plans, avoiding the underprovisioning issue. Finally, 
the cloud data center itself manages the underlying 
infrastructure and technical problems, so that 
customers do not have to concern about IT 
maintenance nor to acquire a wide hardware 
competence. 
However, significant challenges are yet to be 
addressed. Cloud is a young computing model and 
many systems are still in a development state: a lack 
of standard Application Public Interfaces (API) 
brings providers to use proprietary interfaces in their 
services, thus restricting the ability for consumers to 
move from a provider to another. 
2.3 Cloud Foundry and OpenStack 
Cloud Foundry is an open source cloud computing 
Platform as a Service (PaaS) being developed by 
several contributors, among which EMC, IBM, 
Rackspace, and VMware can be mentioned. Cloud 
Foundry is designed to support application 
development with high productivity, taking into 
account SaaS integration: it brings innovation in 
application services and at the same times 
incorporates heterogeneous cloud deployment 
options to facilitate migration. As overviewed by 
(Heller, 2014), Cloud Foundry provides easy to 
install frameworks that support languages such as 
Java, Node.js, Ruby and Go. Once an application 
has been deployed, Cloud Foundry stores it in an 
image which then is run within a container. 
OpenStack is an open source system that 
provides Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) functiona-
lities. It comprises a series of components such as: 
Keystone for identity management, Nova for 
computing, Neutron for networking, Glace for image 
IdentityManagementinCloudPlatformsusingVOMSandSPID
97
storing, Horizon for dashboard, Swift for storage, 
Ceilometers for telemetry and billing accountability, 
Heat for orchestration. As an IaaS system, 
OpenStack can be installed over the bare hardware; 
it allows to create, launch, monitor and terminate 
instances of virtual machines, connect them over 
virtual networks, and mount virtual storage drives. 
Cloud Foundry is one of those instances that can be 
deployed over OpenStack. 
3 IDENTITY MANAGEMENT 
Another arguable aspect is the security of cloud. 
Many of the applications available on the internet 
usually require an authentication from the user. How 
a service manages and stores the customers identity 
is a very concerning issue. Privacy and data 
protection are matters that cannot be taken lightly, as 
users may need to provide their own personal 
information to access a service, and the system must 
assure the confidentiality of such data. 
3.1 Authentication Vs Authorization 
In a scenario where a user needs to authenticate, the 
idea is to set up a centralized system, where digital 
identities are managed by an external entity called 
identity provider (IdP), instead of entrusting the 
resource provider (the entity which supplies 
resources) itself with this functionality. The users 
identities are stored in the IdP, and a user can 
authenticate against the IdP to obtain his own digital 
identity. Additionally, including the IdP in a 
federated environment, is it possible to extend the 
centralized authentication to each cloud in the 
federation. For the users, this means they can own a 
single digital identity, and they can authenticate with 
that digital identity in any cloud belonging to the 
federation. Regarding resource providers, they won't 
have to store, secure and assure the privacy of the 
users information, as this work is delegated to IdPs. 
In such context, we can point out the concepts of 
authentication and authorization. The former deals 
with the user identity: it permits to verify a person as 
he login to an application. The latter allows to grant 
permissions to carry out a given action, and applies 
both to users and to processes that must access a 
protected resource (Alfieri et al., 2005).  
Although these two operations may feel very 
similar, actually they are pretty different. A user 
authenticates against a website to access to his 
account. Once logged, the user gains full control and 
thus can perform any action enabled for that 
account. In contrast, the user can authorize a third 
party application or website to use some 
functionalities or to act as behalf of the user. In this 
case, the third party application is not provided with 
user credentials, but instead with a token it can use 
to request access to resources or functionalities. The 
above approach is a step forward to improve 
security, and it allows a user to have a single digital 
identity instead of creating a second account in the 
third party website. 
This means more control for the user, as he can 
select and restrict the allowed operations for the 
third party app, and at the same time the third party 
collects only user's token instead of his credentials. 
If the third party gets hacked, the hacker will be able 
to perform only the operations permitted by the user. 
to the third party. To solve this, the user can login to 
the main site and revoke access granted to the third 
party application, and no other action on the original 
website, such as password reset, is needed. 
Authentication process can be performed using 
different kind of information: a password 
(something the user knows); smart cards that contain 
the user identifier (something the user has); a 
physical trait or characteristic that acts as user 
identifier, such as fingerprints and voice recognition 
(something the user is). Currently the most used 
techniques are the former (usually with username 
and password) and the second (typically a certificate 
contained in a smart card, or a OTP token). 
In recent years the use of double factor 
authentication is increasing, since it offers a stronger 
security: smart cards are more difficult to be cloned 
than a password to be stolen. However this solution 
requires the user to always bring with him the smart 
card containing the identifier token. On the other 
hand, the password-base authentication remains the 
wider adopted solution, and reason is the simplicity 
of the process: users only need to remember their 
credentials, without the need of having any 
additional card that provides a certificate or device 
to receive an OTP. Furthermore, this is the most 
technologically neutral solution, as it do not require 
any specific device to read user’s smart card. 
Some examples of authentication systems used in 
cloud are: OpenID (OpenID 2015), User Account 
and Authentication (UAA, 2015), DIGIPASS as a 
Service (DIGIPASS, 2015), PowerBroker Open 
(PowerBroker Open, 2015). Instances of 
authorization tools are Conjur (Conjur, 2015), UAA, 
and OAuth 2.0 (OAuth 2.0, 2012). 
3.2 VOMS 
VOMS (Virtual Organization Membership Service) 
(VOMS, 2014) is defined by (Venturi et al., 2008) as 
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a tool that allows to define a dynamic collection of 
individuals, institutions, and resources, in order to 
flexible, secure, coordinated resource sharing across 
dynamic, multi-institutional collaborations. It is 
based on the concept of Virtual Organization (VO) 
that defines virtual collections, and adds 
functionalities to manage these abstract entities. It 
permits a resource owner to define a set of rules for 
sharing his resources, which can be used to drive 
authorization decisions. Such characteristic fits well 
in the grid computing system, an indeed VOMS is 
currently the de-facto standard for VO management: 
it is already being used by Lightweight Middleware 
for Grid Computing (gLite) now developed by EMI 
(EMI, 2014), and the Virtual Data ToolKit (VDT) 
(VDT, 2014) grid infrastructures. 
3.2.1 VOMS Architecture 
In order to provide its functionalities, the VOMS 
supplies several interfaces with different features 
(Alfieri et al., 2004): 
 User client: sends a request to the User server 
containing user credentials (typically a X.509 
certificate) and obtains a list of groups, roles 
and capabilities of the user; 
 User server (we will refer to it more generally 
as VOMS server): receives requests from a 
user client and returns information about the 
user signed with the server X.509 certificate; 
 Administration Client: is the tool used by VO 
administrators to manage users, groups, roles, 
etc; 
 Administration Server: receives the requests 
from administration clients and accordingly 
updates the data in the system. 
The server is essentially a front-end to an 
RDBMS, where all the information about users is 
stored. It acts as an Attribute Authority; the user 
sends to the VOMS server a request for attributes, 
and authenticates using his certificate. The VOMS 
server creates signed assertions containing the user’s 
requested VO attributes, according to the groups and 
roles he has been assigned. The user, once received 
the information, creates a proxy certificate including 
assertions returned by the VOMS server. This proxy 
certificate is presented to the resource provider, 
which uses those information to decide whether 
granting resources or not. The user can request 
certificates from more than one server. 
More in detail, the authorization process is 
accomplished following the steps below (Alfieri et 
al., 2005): 
1. The user and the VOMS server authenticate 
each other using their certificates; 
2. The user creates a request, signs it with his 
certificate, and sends it to the VOMS server; 
3. The VOMS server verifies the user’s identity 
and checks the syntactic correctness of the 
request; 
4. The VOMS server creates a response 
containing the required information, signs it 
with its certificate, and sends it back to the 
user; 
5. The user checks the validity of the information 
received; 
6. The user optionally repeats this process for 
other VOMS servers; 
7. The user creates the proxy certificate 
containing all the information received from 
the VOMS server(s); information is included in 
an Attribute Certificate signed by the VOMS 
server itself; 
8. The user presents the proxy certificate to the 
resource provider, which decides if granting 
the access to resources. 
3.3 Spid 
SPID (Sistema Pubblico per la gestione dell'Identità 
Digitale) (SPID, 2014) stands for "Public System for 
the management of the Digital Identity"; it is a 
project lead by the AgID (Agenzia per l'Italia 
Digitale), the Italian agency in charge of the 
realization and diffusion of information and 
communication technology. 
The goal is to provide a federated and centralized 
authentication service, by managing the registration 
and provisioning tools; the strong authentication 
implies that a certain digital identity corresponds 
unambiguously to a specific person. As this system 
has been designed primarily to facilitate the work of 
public administrations (but not only), the user that 
performs the authentication must be accurately 
identified. Trust is enforced by AgID, which 
maintains a list of entities complying with SPID 
specification and performs the necessary monitoring 
activities. 
3.3.1 SPID Architecture 
SPID establishes a federated environment formed by 
Identity Providers (IdP), Resource Providers (RP) 
called also Service Providers (SP), users and 
Attribute Authorities (AA). An IdP is an entity 
which stores the users digital identities, and allows 
users to authenticate; on the other hand, an RP is an 
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entity that provides services and resources. An AA 
releases users qualified attributes, generally 
requested by RP to compute permission decisions. In 
a federated environment, SPID allows a user to 
authenticate against one IdP to obtain the strictly 
necessary information regarding his identity, needed 
to access a protected service or resource offered by 
an RP. In this scenario authentication is delegated to 
the IdP rather than to the RP itself.  
SPID provides three levels of authentication due 
to the need to comply with currently most adopted 
technologies as well as to keep up with the newest 
ones; each level complies with the international 
ISO/IEC DIS 29115 (ISO/IEC 29115, 2014). The 
first level requires username and password; the 
second level implies multi-factor authentication 
based on OTP token; the third level requires multi-
factor authentication based on digital certificates. 
To perform authentication, SPID can incorporate 
several IdPs, and each of them is an independent 
entity complying with SPID specifications. Thus a 
user digital identity is not replicated on each IdP, but 
is rather stored in one location. Then, when the user 
authenticates against the IdP that provides his 
identity, that authentication is accepted by any RP in 
the system, because RPs do not discriminate IdPs. 
The correct interaction sequence follows these steps: 
1. the user requests access to a resource on a RP 
through a User Agent (UA, generally a 
browser); 
2. the RP sends to UA an authentication request; 
3. the UA is redirected to the appropriate IdP; 
4. the IdP starts a challenge for credentials with 
the user; 
5. the user provides his credentials; 
6. the IdP checks for credentials correctness then 
returns assertions, signed by IdP itself, 
containing the authentication statements for the 
RP to the UA, otherwise if they are incorrect 
continues with the challenge. 
7. the UA forwards the assertion created by the 
IdP to the RP; 
8. the RP checks the validity of assertions, 
identifies the user and delivers the service. 
4 CONSIDERATION OF 
IMPLEMENTATION OF 
IDENTITY MANAGEMENT IN 
THE CLOUD PLATFORM 
In order to improve privacy and data protection on 
cloud computing, we are pioneering and studying a 
model in which, in order to access a resource or 
service supplied by a resource provider, 
authentication is delegated to a federated identity 
provider, and authorization is performed by a 
federated attribute authority. Specifically, we are 
proposing an integration of VOMS for authorization 
ad SPID for authentication, in the Cloud Foundry 
PaaS system. Such integration aims to exploit the 
federation environment provided by SPID, and to 
incorporate the qualified attribute release performed 
by VOMS. 
4.1 VOMS Vs SPID 
Although VOMS and SPID may seem similar, these 
are two deeply different concepts. VOMS role is to 
supply authorization information regarding a user in 
a certain domain. It provides a single service that 
can be executed on a single machine. SPID is a more 
complex system, comprises several entities that 
cooperate and communicate using protocols adopted 
by SPID. It orchestrates the interaction of IdPs, 
users, RPs and AAs, and also specifies the technical 
standards for interoperability. In this context, VOMS 
is one of these entities: it is essentially an AA that 
operates performing authorization service by issuing 
tokens on demand; on the other hand, SPID includes 
IdPs which provide authentication service.  
Another relevant difference lies in the policy 
matters. A VOMS service do not require any 
accreditation, thus can be set up and made run 
autonomously. SPID is a system that the Italian 
government aims to adopt in a large scale, in order 
to spread the use of digital identities, thus entities 
must be accredited. Finally, VOMS is being used, 
mainly in grid computing, since several years, 
whereas SPID is a novel scheme targeted for the 
management of digital identities, thus supplies a 
wider and more complete view over this issues. 
4.2 Integration of VOMS and SPID in 
Cloud Foundry 
For the integration to be successful, each system 
must be analyzed in order to understand how it 
works and interacts with users or other components. 
In particular, we analyzed the input and output of the 
involved systems. The goal is to create a structure 
composed by SPID and VOMS that can operate and 
replace the Cloud Foundry build-in login system, 
called UAA; to accomplish this, first we need to 
understand its mechanisms.  
The UAA (User Account and Authentication 
Service) is the identity management service of Cloud 
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Foundry. As stated in (Features of the UAA, 2012), 
it "is responsible for securing the platform services 
and providing a single sign on for web applications", 
and offers several features such as Centralized 
Identity Management, Delegation Access to 
Services, User Account Management and Client 
Application Registration.  
When a user performs the login into a Cloud 
Foundry Resource Provider, the authentication and 
authorization processes are handled by this 
component. (UAA Server, 2012) specifies that the 
UAA acts both as Login Server and an OAuth 2.0 
Authorization Server (OAuth 2.0, 2012), managing 
resources access by granting tokens which are 
delivered to the client application. These tokens 
contain, among the other, user information such as 
the 'user_id', the 'user_name', and the 'scope' that 
specifies the level of access granted by the user to 
the token. 
Figure 1 reports and compares the input and 
output of each system we analyzed. This step is 
crucial to understand if VOMS and SPID can be 
integrated in Cloud Foundry, and which gaps are 
still to be filled. 
 
Figure 1: Comparison of the input and output requirements 
of UAA, VOMS and SPID. 
When accessing resources on the internet, 
security must be ensured, especially when an 
authentication process is performed. SPID issues this 
problem by using standard SAML (SAML 2.0, 
2005) message format. 
SAML is an XML-based data format protocol 
used for authentication and authorization process. 
The SAML specification, accordingly with SPID 
requirements, defines three roles: the user, the IdP, 
and the RP. It specifies three components: 
assertions, protocol, and binding. There are three 
assertion types: authentication (validates the user's 
identity), attribute (contains specific information 
about the user), and authorization (specifies the 
user's authorizations). Then, the protocol defines the 
format for sending and receiving assertions, whereas 
binding defines how SAML messages can be 
mapped to SOAP messages. 
On the other hand, VOMS uses certificates to 
address the identification of the users, needed to 
release the user qualified attributes; however 
(Venturi et al., 2008) shows how VOMS can be 
adapted to exchange SAML messages. VOMS runs 
in an own server rather than living inside the 
authentication server. If a HTTP server is set up, 
VOMS can be used to perform SAML authorization, 
as SAML can transport both authorization and 
authentication information; such SAML-based 
VOMS can therefore accept SAML requests 
containing the user identifier, for instance the user 
certificate, and return a SAML message composed 
of assertions containing user authorizations. 
In this context, SPID acts as authentication 
service, allowing a user to provide his credential in 
order to authenticate in the system through an IdP, 
and VOMS operates as an external AA, performing 
authorization service. 
 
Figure 2: SPID and VOMS integration in Cloud Foundry. 
Whenever a user wants to access a resource on a 
Cloud Foundry RP, the system performs the 
following steps, depicted in Figure 2, in this order: 
1. the user requests access to a resource on a RP 
through a User Agent (UA); 
2. the RP sends to UA an authentication request; 
3. the UA is redirected to the corresponding IdP; 




5. the user provides his credentials; 
6. the IdP checks for credentials correctness then 
returns assertions, signed by IdP itself, 
containing the authentication statements for 
the RP to the UA, whereas if credentials are 
incorrect continues with the challenge. 
7. the UA forwards the assertions created by the 
IdP to the RP, the RP checks for validity of 
the assertions and identifies the user; 
8. the RP sends to the VOMS an authorization 
request, including assertions of the 
authenticated user; 
9. the VOMS checks for validity of assertions, 
and then returns a response, which includes 
assertions containing user authorization 
information, to the RP; 
10. the RP checks for validity of assertions, 
checks if the user is authorized to access the 
resource and delivers it. 
As already mentioned, during the communication 
SAML messages containing or requesting user 
information are sent. SAML messages are encoded 
using the Base64 format and compressed with a 
DEFLATE algorithm. In accordance with SPID 
guideline (SPID specifications, 2014), a SAML 
message, which is XML-based, must include 
specific tags. Among these, the most relevant is the 
tag that contains the assertions. An assertion is 




  <saml:Attribute...> 
    <saml:AttributeValue ...> 
      myAttributeValue 
    </saml:AttributeValue> 
  </saml:Attribute> 
</saml:AttributeStatement> 
 
Beside the benefits mentioned above, 
authentication (not limited to the cloud environment) 
still presents risks regarding security. Identity theft 
is one of the most concerning matters in a federated 
centralized environment: if a user credentials are 
stolen, the hacker can access all the services with the 
same credentials. This problem is issued by using 
strong authentication protocols, where information 
are sent over secure connections. 
Moreover, a large scale deployment of such 
architecture requires specific software to be 
deployed on each entity. RPs must be able to create 
SAML requests, redirect users to their IdP, and 
receive SAML responses. IdPs must be able to 
receive SAML requests, perform authentication, and 
return SAML responses redirecting users back to the 
RP. SPID specifies that IdP must use non-
proprietary solutions (in terms of software and 
hardware), in order to foster interoperability and 
avoid vendors technological lock-in. 
Setting up a working federation based on SPID 
will require time to complete the specifications, test 
the interactions between entities and address any 
further technical issue. The diffusion of this 
framework is going to be gradual: all the Italian 
public administrations are expected to become SPID 
RP compliant within 24 months since the 
accreditation of the first IdP. Private entities may 
intentionally join the federation, once they are 
become SPID compliant. In addition, the number of 
digital identities will increase over time, together 
with the spreading of this technology among the 
territory, only if this solution will prove to be 
reliable, efficient and user-friendly. SPID aims to 
simplify and secure the user access to services, but 
may not succeed if such features, that are 
fundamental for a wide adoption of digital identities 
in a federation, are not ensured. 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we studied a cloud computing system 
handling identity management issues. First we 
presented the state of the art of cloud technology, 
describing the principal advantages and downsides 
affecting it. The main goal was to improve the 
identity management in the cloud PaaS model, in 
particular Cloud Foundry. For this purpose, VOMS 
as authorization and SPID as authentication systems 
were chosen to be integrated. Regarding the 
communication, SAML was chosen as it is a 
protocol created to transport authentication and 
authorization statements. Such solution can benefit 
in terms of trust (since SPID provides a federate 
environment), usability proof (since VOMS is being 
used in grid since many years), and interoperability 
(since SAML is a open-standard format based on 
international XML format). 
A future work may consist in setting up a system 
as discussed above. However, SPID is currently in a 
development phase, and it has not been deployed in 
Italian territory yet. 
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